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Abstract
Sick-pay is a common provision in labor contracts. It insures work-
ers against a sudden loss of income due to unexpected absences and
helps them smooth consumption. Therefore, many governments find
sick-pay socially desirable and choose to mandate its provision. But
sick-pay is not without its problems. Not only it suﬀers from moral haz-
ard but more importantly it is subject to a potentially serious adverse
selection problem (higher sick-pay attracts sicker workers). In this pa-
per we report results of an experiment which inquires to the extend
and the severity of the adverse selection when sick-pay is voluntary ver-
sus when it is mandatory. Theoretically, mandating sick-pay may be
eﬀective in diminishing adverse selection. However, our data provide
clean evidence that counteracting eﬀects are more salient. Mandatory
sick pay exacerbates moral hazard problems by changing fairness per-
ceptions and, as a consequence, increases sick pay provision far above
the mandatory levels.
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1 Introduction
Sick-pay is one of the most controversial provisions in labor contracts. It
insures workers against a loss of income from unexpected absences. When a
worker suﬀers a spell of absence, sick-pay covers some portion (or all) of his
wages for that period. This smooths out workers’ income streams and may
led to substantial welfare gains especially for those who have tight budgets
and bad access to credit. But to firms, sick-pay could seem like a waste
of money. Not only do workers have no explicit incentives to make up for
the losses caused by their absences (moral hazard), but what’s worse, sick-
pay attracts primarily the sicker and the riskier workers (adverse selection).
This immediately begs a question why would any firm want to oﬀer sick-pay?
There are at least two explanations: (i) sick-pay is considered a “perk” and
inspires the workers to provide an extra eﬀort; and/or (ii) in many countries
sick-pay is simply mandated by the government.
The controversy revolves around the question of regulation. Should it
be left to the markets to supply sick-pay or should the government impose a
mandatory minimum1. A voluntary provision by firms is only possible if its
individually rational. This requires that the workers are suﬃciently recip-
rocal and the gift-value of sick-pay is suﬃciently high so that the problems
of moral hazard and adverse selection are overcome. If this is the case then
there is no need for the government to intervene. But when the workers act
opportunistically, the markets are likely to fail and then it may be in the
interest of the government to regulate sick-pay.
A single minimum standard accomplishes two objectives: (i) it provides
all workers with an equal access to at least some level of sick-pay; and (ii)
by “leveling the playing field,” it reduces the possibility of adverse selection.
When all contracts are similar to each other it becomes diﬃcult for the
sicker workers to find those that are most generous. But the reduction in
adverse selection may come at a high cost of aggravating moral hazard.
If all firms have to provide sick-pay to everyone, then the opportunistic
workers will exhaust the benefits to the fullest. But this is not all. Even the
reciprocal workers are adversely aﬀected. When sick-pay is mandated it is no
longer considered a perk but rather an entitlement. The reciprocity motive
disappears. This may force the firms to either oﬀer higher than required
sick-pay in an attempt to restore its gift-value (e.g., Falk et al., 2006), or
withdraw all sick-pay in excess of the minimum in order to minimize the
costs. However, both alternatives can be quite costly. In each case the
1reference discussion about regulation...
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reciprocity motive is crowded out by the mandatory minimum which reduces
the size and the value of the gift. Therefore, crowding out of incentives may
play a major role in driving the opportunity cost of government regulation.
The welfare eﬀects of mandated sick-cannot be evaluated without un-
derstanding the trade-oﬀ between adverse selection2 and crowding out of
incentives3. In this paper we take an experimental approach and imple-
ment a labor market similar to Fehr et al. (1998) in which four firms oﬀer
contracts with sick-pay to four workers. Following Duersch et al. (2009) a
contract can condition the wage on whether the worker has “showed up for
work” (wage w when eﬀort is positive) or “stayed at home” (replacement
rate r when eﬀort is zero). A worker observes a menu of contracts and can
accept one of them at any time. Once all workers are employed each of them
chooses a costly eﬀort. A nonzero eﬀort creates a positive profit on the side
of the firm only with probability p. With probability (1 − p) the worker is
“sick” and then his eﬀort is automatically set to zero.
We study the eﬀect of adverse selection by contrasting the case where
all workers have the same probability of being sick (p) with the case where
exactly half of the workers has a low pl and the other half has a high ph
(pl < p < ph). We are particularly interested in studying the contract
choices of diﬀerent types of workers. Adverse selection implies that the high-
risk workers (with ph) are more likely to accept contracts with high sick-pay
benefits. But notice that on its own adverse selection is not necessarily
harmful to the firms. The high-risk workers may also be more appreciative
of the higher benefits and provide higher eﬀorts in return. Our experiment
provides a clear evidence that the adverse selection is present and the work-
ers’ reciprocal behavior is not suﬃcient to neutralize its negative eﬀect on
the firms’ profits.
As we discussed earlier, the government has a way of fighting adverse se-
lection by requiring a minimum level sick-pay. But whether this is eﬀective
or not depends on how much of the reciprocal behavior is lost due to crowd-
ing out of incentives. A second dimension of our experiment inquires into
this question. We implement a “mandatory condition” in which the firms are
forced to provide a minimum level of sick-pay r¯4. Our results indicate that
adverse selection is alive and well even under mandated sick-pay. This hap-
pens because the distribution of sick-pay does not simply collapse around r¯.
Firms oﬀer large variety of sick-pay in excess of the mandatory minimum5.
2 related literature: selection.
3 related literature: crowding out.
4 r¯ is set to the average of what the firms normally provide under no restrictions.
5A similar finding is reported in Falk et al. (2006) in the context of a minimum wage
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Because the firms chose to be extra generous there is a smaller scope for
crowding out of incentives, but on the other hand, the extra generosity also
implies higher cost of sick-pay and leads firms into making losses.
The rest of the papers is organized as follows....
Literature footnotes:
[Crowding out:] The negative eﬀect of crowding out of incentives is well
documented. For example Gneezy and Rustichini (2000a,b) conduct a series
of experiments in which subjects are confronted with various tasks. They
find a positive relationship between monetary rewards and performance.
The striking result, however, is that the performance of subjects who get
no reward what so ever is often higher than for those who get low but
positive payments. This is attributed to the fact that monetary incentives
crowd out the intrinsic motivation which is associated with completing the
task rather than with the monetary reward. Falk and Kosfeld (2006) study a
control game in which the recipient can enforce a certain size of the gift from
the dictator. They find a strong eﬀect of crowding out of incentives. The
recipients are on average about 30% better oﬀ not controlling, i.e., letting
the dictators choose the amount freely, than enforcing a certain minimum.
The finding is attributed to the negative eﬀect of distrust which is implicit
in the forcing action of the recipient.
[Selection:] Duersch, Oechssler and Vadovic (2009) the selection treat-
ment; Charness and Cabrales (2008), Güth, Königstein, Kovács, and Zala-
Mezõ (2001) - but these papers are not about selection into contracts but
rather about responses by individual types to oﬀered contracts. (Not sure
whether we want to also reference some (auction/oligopoly) market entry
and exit experiments.)
[Minimum wages:] Brandts and Charness (2004), Falk, Fehr, Zehnder
(2006)...
2 Experimental design and procedures
In our experiment, we implement a modified gift—exchange game between
employers and workers. In all periods of the experiment, employers choose
a contract to oﬀer to their employees and workers choose eﬀorts given those
oﬀered contracts. Workers can choose intended eﬀorts, e˜, from the set
{0, 1, ..., 10}. An eﬀort of 0 is interpreted as skipping work. Then, there is
a random draw by the computer, independent across periods and subjects,
regulation.
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which with probability p = 1/3, sets the chosen eﬀort to 0. This random
draw models the probability that workers become sick and cannot appear at
the workplace. Thus, with probability 2/3, realized eﬀort, e, equals intended
eﬀort, e˜; with probability 1/3, realized eﬀort is zero. Note that the employer
cannot distinguish the cases when realized eﬀort is zero because the worker
chose an intended eﬀort of zero or because the worker became sick. Eﬀort
costs for the workers are a function of realized eﬀort as shown in Table 1.6
The eﬀort cost function for e > 1 follows the usual convex shape. To model
the fact that showing up at the work place takes some extra eﬀort, the mar-
ginal cost from zero eﬀort (staying at home) to an eﬀort of 1 (showing up
for work) is increased to 3.7
Table 1: The agent’s eﬀort cost function
e 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
C(e) 0 3 4 6 8 10 12 14 17 20 24
Employers oﬀer contracts (w, r) which consists of two components, a
wage, w ∈W := {0, 1, ..., 100}, and a sick pay (replacement) rate, r ∈ R :=
{0%, 1%, ..., 100%}. The wage, w, is paid whenever the worker shows up for
work (i.e. when e > 0). Whenever the worker does not show up for work (i.e.
when realized eﬀort is zero), he receives sick payment, which is the product
of the wage and the replacement rate, rw. The fact that wage payments can
only be contingent on whether realized eﬀort is larger than zero, is based
on the assumption that employer can only verify whether workers show up
for work or not. As usual, diﬀerent eﬀort levels e > 0 cannot be contracted
upon e.g. because they cannot be verified in court.8 A lower bound on
the replacement rate, r, is a treatment variable which reflects a minimum
mandatory sick pay.
The payoﬀs resulting from contract and eﬀort choices are as follows.
Each unit of eﬀort yields a gross profit of 20 to the employer. Deducting
6That is, when agents are sick, they have eﬀort costs of 0.
7 In the instructions we used neutral language like “the computer set eﬀorts to zero”
rather than term “illness” or being “sick”. However, Duersch et al. (2008) show that
this frame does not aﬀect results in a similar experiment. In all treatments, we used an
employer—worker frame since this seems to be the natural setting. Note, however, that
according to results by Fehr et al. (2007), the employer—worker frame and a seller—buyer
frame yield essentially identical results.
8 If they were, there would be, of course, no interesting incentive problem.
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wage payments we obtain
πE =
½
−rw if e = 0
20e−w if e > 0 .
The worker’s payoﬀ is given as
πW =
½
rw if e = 0
w − c(e) if e > 0 .
In the labor market, firms compete for workers and workers compete for
jobs. Throughout the experiment, a group of 4 workers interacts with a
group of 4 employers in a series of repetitions, which we call periods. The
experiment is repeated for 20 periods. Each period is split into two stages:
(i) the job market stage and (ii) the production stage. In the job market
stage runs as a continuous time posted oﬀer market and lasts 60 seconds.
Employers make publicly observable oﬀers to workers. Each employer is
allowed to post only one oﬀer at a time; however, this oﬀer can be withdrawn
and/or changed anytime. Workers can accept any or none of the outstanding
oﬀers. Once an oﬀer is accepted by a single worker, it disappears form the
screen, and the employer can post another (possibly equal) oﬀer. This way,
a single employer can end up with any number of workers ranging from 0 to
4. Equally well, a worker who is hesitant may end up with no job at all. One
restriction imposed by the design, and which we feel is a realistic feature of
labor markets, is that while firms can employ several workers at the same
time, a single worker cannot hold multiple jobs. After the 60 seconds are
over, workers still have time (how much?) to accept any outstanding oﬀers.
The job market stage ends when either all 4 workers have accepted an oﬀer
or indicated that they are not interested in accepting one.
In the production stage, each worker submits his intended eﬀort. Then,
the random draw by the computer determines whether a worker is “sick” or
not. To minimize reputation and/or possible group eﬀects, we limit the in-
formation displayed between periods to the outcome of the individual match.
The worker observes wage oﬀer, intended and realized eﬀort as well as the
resulting payoﬀ of the respective period. Employers are reminded how many
workers they could attract, which contracts were accepted and whether the
realized eﬀort for the respective contracts was equal to zero or greater than
zero. Additionally, they learn their own payoﬀ. Subjects are neither allowed
to observe their partners’ identities nor their past behavior.
Our experiment has a 2×2 design (see Table 2) with treatment variables:
(i) minimum mandatory sick pay and (ii) homogenous versus heterogenous
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likelihood of getting sick. Our first treatment “HomFree” imposes no re-
striction on the replacement rate, and all workers have the same probability
of getting sick, pi = 0.2. With the second treatment, “HomMan,” we isolate
the eﬀect of mandatory sick pay by setting a minimum replacement rate of
40%.9
In the remaining two heterogenous treatments (“HetFree” and “Het-
Man”), we allow for the possibility of adverse selection by inducing het-
erogenous probabilities of getting sick. Out of 4 workers in each group, 2
workers are “low—risk” workers with pi = 0.1 and 2 workers are “high—risk”
workers with pi = 0.3. HetFree imposes no minimum replacement rate, while
HetMan imposes a minimum rate of 40%.
Table 2: Treatments
minimum prob. of being sick
sick pay homogeneous heterogenous
rate 0.2 0.1/0.3
0% HomFree HetFree
40% HomMan HetMan
At the end of the gift—exchange experiment there is a questionnaire (see
Appendix ??) with a number of questions regarding subjects’ demographics.
Finally, a second questionnaire elicits risk preferences following the method
introduced by Holt and Laury (2002). This questionnaire is incentivized in
the usual way by randomly selecting one pair of lotteries by the throw of a
10—sided die. The chosen lottery is then resolved by throwing the die again.
In total, 192 subjects participated in our experiment. They were mostly
undergraduate students from the University of Jena. There were 8 sessions
and no subject participated in more than one session. The experiments
were conducted in the computer lab of the Max—Planck Institute in Jena.
Subjects were recruited via the ORSEE online recruiting system (Greiner,
2004).
For the experiment, we used the z—tree software package provided by
Fischbacher (2007). After reading the instructions (see Appendix), subjects
had to answer a series of detailed questions in order to make sure that they
understood the experimental instructions and were able to do all necessary
9We conducted treatment HomFree first and set the minimum replacement rate in the
Het treatments such that it roughly corresponded to the median oﬀered sick pay rate of
treatment HomFree.
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calculations.
To avoid wealth eﬀects, subjects were paid their earnings from one ran-
domly selected period from the gift—exchange experiment. Each subject
threw a die to determine which period’s payoﬀ was being paid. Payoﬀs from
this period were paid out with an exchange rate of 10?? points = 1 euro.
Additionally, subjects received their outcome from the Holt—Laury question-
naire plus a show—up fee of 7.50 euro. The average payoﬀ was about 14.32
euro (about US $19 at the time of the experiment). Experiments lasted
about 120 minutes including instruction time.
3 Behavioral hypotheses
The standard prediction based on rational self—interested and risk neutral
individuals can be obtained as follows. Given that contracts can only con-
dition on whether e ≥ 1 or e = 0, self—interested workers will never choose
an eﬀort level above 1. Workers are second movers and therefore choose
an eﬀort of 1 if (1 − pi) [w − c(1)] + pirw ≥ rw, which yields the incentive
constraint
r ≤ (w − 3)/w, (IC)
and 0 otherwise. Therefore, if employers want to induce an eﬀort of 1, they
have to oﬀer a wage of at least 3. In HomMan and HetMan, where r ≥ 0.4,
the lowest equilibrium wage compatible with (IC) is 5.
Employers will only oﬀer a contract if they make no losses given the
worker they attract with this contract chooses an intended eﬀort of 1. This
yields the participation constraint for employers
(1− pi)(20− w)− piwr ≥ 0. (PC)
Obviously, given (PC) employers will never oﬀer wages above 20. In
HomMan and HetMan the highest equilibrium wage compatible with (PC)
is 18.
Together, the two constraints yield the following predictions.
Hypothesis (self—interested) If individuals are rational and self—interested,
we obtain the following predictions.
1. In treatment HomFree and HetFree, workers choose an intended
eﬀort level of 1. Employers oﬀer wages between 3 and 20.
2. In treatments HomMan and HetMan, workers choose an intended
eﬀort level of 1. Employers oﬀer wages between 5 and 18.
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In fact, the predictions cannot be sharpened as there are subgame perfect
equilibria in HomFree and HetFree in which all the surplus goes to workers
and others in which all the surplus goes to employers. Recall that workers
have ??? seconds to accept any outstanding oﬀers after the posted oﬀer
period of 60 seconds has ended. In this subgame, workers will accept the
best available oﬀer. Thus, if there are still four workers available in t = 60,
employers oﬀer (3, 0%) or (3, 1%) in equilibrium. Hence, the following two
subgame perfect equilibria are the equilibria with the lowest and with the
highest possible wages, respectively, in HomFree and HetFree.
Equilibrium (20,0%) Employers oﬀer (20, 0%) in all t < 60. If four work-
ers are still available in t = 60, employers oﬀer (3, 0%). If less than
four workers are available, employers oﬀer (20, 0%) in t = 60. Workers
accept only oﬀers of (20, 0%) in all t ≤ 60 and accept the best available
oﬀer thereafter.
Equilibrium (3,0%) Employers post no contract as long as t < 60 and no
contract oﬀer has been posted. If any employer posts a contract in t <
60, each employer immediately oﬀers (20, 0%) in all t < 60 afterwards.
If 4 workers are available in t = 60, employers oﬀer (3, 0%). If less than
four workers are available, employers oﬀer (20, 0%) in t = 60. Workers
accept the best available oﬀer that is at least as good as (3, 0%) in all
t ≤ 60 and accept the best available oﬀer thereafter.
An alternative hypothesis to Hypothesis (self—interested) based on a
large number of gift—exchange experiments is the following. The hypoth-
esis is well established in the literature with respect to wages. It has not
been tested with respect to sick pay so far.
Hypothesis (reciprocity) Higher wage and sick pay oﬀers are recipro-
cated by workers with higher eﬀorts. Consequently, eﬀorts above 1
and wages above 20 can be expected.
With respect to the introduction of a required minimum rate of sick
pay (in treatments HomMan and HetMan) there are again two diﬀerent
hypotheses. Both are based on the well established idea (see e.g. Falk et
al. 2008) that intentions matter. That is, it matters for the outcome of a
game not only what players consider to be fair outcomes but also what they
consider to be fair intentions of their opponents. The idea that mandating
minimum standard could lead to a crowding out of good intentions seems
to be plausible.
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Hypothesis (crowding out) The voluntary provision of sick pay is re-
duced by the introduction of a mandatory minimum level of sick pay
(i.e. there are fewer sick pay rates with r ≥ 0.4 in HomMan and Het-
Man than in HomFree and HetFree). The argument would be that
control undermines the kindness of oﬀering sick pay and is therefore
reciprocated less. As a consequence, employers find it unprofitable to
oﬀer sick pay.10 Or more directly, employers who would have oﬀered
sick pay above 40% consider the mandated level as a signal for what
one should oﬀer and oﬀer then exactly 40%.11
Hypothesis (anchoring) In the presence of a mandatory minimum level
of sick pay, sick pay is not just raised to the mandated level of 40% but
shifts the entire distribution of sick pay upwards. The reason for this
could be that the introduction of a legal minimum sets a new anchor
and thus aﬀect subjects’ perceptions of fairness (see Falk, Fehr, and
Zehnder, 2006 for this in the context of minimum wages).
Hypothesis (adverse selection) In treatments HetFree and HetMan there
is adverse selection of workers with a high probability of becoming sick
into contracts that oﬀer high sick pay rates. As a consequence, em-
ployers oﬀer less or even no sick pay.
4 Results
We begin by presenting some summary statistics of the main variables of
interest. Table 3 presents average wages, sick pay rates, and eﬀorts for all
accepted contracts, separately for our four treatments. Unless otherwise
stated, eﬀort always refers to intended eﬀort, that is, the eﬀort chosen by
subjects before the computer can reduce eﬀort to zero with some probability.
Figures 1 through 3 ??? show how the same variables vary over the 20
periods of our experiment. While there seems to be a slight upwards trend
in wages and sick pay, there seems to be a downward trend in eﬀorts (see
below for a formal confirmation of this through a regression).
Also shown in Table 3 are the average profits of workers and employers
per period. As intended, competition by employers for workers is so strong
that essentially all the surplus goes to workers.
10For a similar eﬀect with respect to minimum wages see Brandts and Charness (2004)
and Engelmann and Kübler (2007).
11Jörg: I think we should not mention the "Hidden cost of control"
argument anymore (Michael Kosfeld convinced me that it doesn’t really fit
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Table 3: Average wages, sick pay, eﬀorts, and profits in the various treat-
ments
Wage Sick pay Eﬀort Profit worker Profit employer
HomFree 67.89 37.98% 3.31 54.73 −7.06
HomMan 63.23 56.84% 3.34 50.96 −4.93
HetFree 70.48 39.01% 3.97 55.78 2.01
HetMan 67.05 56.22% 3.50 53.81 −3.78
4.1 Gift exchange with respect to sick pay
With respect to wages, the data are consistent with the patterns found in
most previous gift—exchange experiments. Wages are far higher than would
be compatible with any equilibrium for selfish and rational agents. Average
wages are between 60 and 70 whereas the selfish prediction is between 0
and 20. Workers reciprocate those wages with eﬀorts that are far above the
predicted selfish level of 1. Those results hold uniformly for all of our four
treatments. In fact, MWU—tests, taking each group of 8 subjects as one
observation, show no significant diﬀerence for wages, eﬀorts, and profits.
Only sick pay rates in the Man treatments are significantly higher than
those in the Free treatments (5% level, two—sided).
The interesting question is whether the well—known gift exchange eﬀect
for wages also works with respect to sick pay.
Preliminary Result: sick pay increases eﬀort in Free treatments but not
in Man treatments.
[include Stefan’s regressions, either fixed effects or tobit]
Table 4: Regressions of contracts on eﬀorts
Treatments
HomFree HetFree HomMan HetMan
wage
sickpay
period
constant
Note: ***, **, * denotes significance on 1, 5, and 10% level respectively. n = 478
in).
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Eﬀectiveness of raising the wage vs. raising sick pay rate: in Free treat-
ments coeﬀ. of wage: 0.044 (HomFree) or 0.061 (HetFree). This is 4.6 (7.36)
times as large as coeﬀ. of sick pay. But each dollar more wage costs in expec-
tation 0.8w+0.2wr, which evaluated at mean of r is 0.876. Each percentage
point sick pay costs 0.2wr, which is 0.136. That is, raising eﬀort through
wages in Free treatments is about as expensive as raising eﬀort through sick
pay.
Result 1 (reciprocity to sick pay): Higher wage are strongly recipro-
cated by workers with higher eﬀorts. High sick pay oﬀers are recipro-
cated by workers in the Free treatments. However, this gift exchange
eﬀect becomes insignificant if a minimum level of sick pay is mandated.
4.2 The consequences of mandating sick pay
As we have discussed above, there are competing hypotheses with respect
to the eﬀects of mandating sick pay. The crowding out hypothesis would
predict that employers who would have liked to oﬀer sick pay below 40%,
would now opt for the required minimum of 40%. And employers who
without regulation would have oﬀered sick pay above 40%, would now also
just oﬀer 40%. The alternative anchoring hypothesis would predict that the
entire distribution of sick pay shifts upwards as the minimum rate sets a
new, higher anchor.
Figures ?? and ?? [cumm. distribution and density] show clearly
that there is no crowding out. The distribution function for the two Man
treatments is everywhere to the right of the one for the Free treatments, indi-
cating that the anchoring hypothesis is supported by our data. Kolmogorov-
Smirnov cannot reject the hypotheses that the distributions are the same
[Rado, how did you run this test? I get a sign. difference when
I treat each contract as one obs. which, however, does not seem
to be right]. Note, in particular, the pronounced increase in sick pay
contracts that oﬀer a 100% replacement rate.
Result 2 (crowding out vs. anchoring): The imposition of a manda-
tory sick pay rate shifts the entire sick pay distribution upwards.
Falk et al. (2006) observe similar eﬀect of minimum wages in a simple
gift-exchange market. The results 3 and 4 can be viewed as an interesting
extension and generalization of this pattern to markets with two-dimensional
prices. The important diﬀerence is that in their case, had the market col-
lapsed around the minimum wage, the workers could not distinguish between
15
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the employers in any way. The firms might therefore find it extra useful to
distinguish themselves by increasing their wages above the level of compe-
tition. The competitive forces of the market are particularly strong in their
setting. In our case, however, this argument is much weaker because even if
the market collapsed around the minimum level of sick-pay, the firms could
still compete with each other via wages. This would be consistent with the
logic of shifting the resources to the most productive uses. The fact that
this does not happen and that the market provides sick-pay well in excess
of what is required indicates an important role that sick-pay plays in how
firms compete for workers.
The higher sick pay rates in the Man treatments, however, are not recip-
rocated by workers through an increase in eﬀorts. As shown in Table 3,
eﬀorts are not significantly diﬀerent under the two regimes. Since also em-
ployers’ profits are about the same, employers must be compensated for
higher sick pay rates by lower wages. And this in turn explains why workers
do not exert higher eﬀorts.
The last two column in Table 4 show that in contrast to the Free treat-
ments, in the Man treatments there is no significant eﬀect of sick pay on
eﬀorts. This seems compatible with the findings of Brandts and Charness
(2004) who find that the kindness of wages is less salient if there is a man-
dated minimum level. In contrast to their findings, however, employers in
our experiment do not react by oﬀering less generous sick pay, presumable
because they have an alternative way (lowering wages) of keeping the total
expected wage bill constant.
4.3 Does adverse selection reduce the voluntary provision of
sick pay?
As in any insurance market there is potential for adverse selection in the
presence of sick pay. Firms oﬀering generous sick pay may end up with
a higher percentage of high—risk workers (those with a sickness rate of 0.3
rather than 0.1) which would harm their profits. Thus, we ask two questions
in this section: (1) Do firms attract more high—risk workers when oﬀering
generous sick pay? And (2), does this potential adverse selection problem
become so severe that it leads to a market break down, i.e. to the elimination
of sick pay on a voluntary basis?
Table 5 sheds light on the first question. High—risk workers tend to accept
contracts with an average sick pay rate which is 3 percentage points higher
than those of low—risk workers. Taking the average sick pay rate of low—
risk workers in a group as one observation and the corresponding sick pay
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rate of the high—risk workers in the same group as the other observation,
we conduct a Wilcoxon—test for related samples with 12 groups (pooling
HetFree and HetMan). According to the Wilcoxon test, sick pay rates of
high—risk workers are diﬀerent from those for low—risk workers at a p—value
of 0.019 (two—sided test).
On the other hand, wages of high—risk workers are significantly lower
(p = 0.010) than those accepted by low—risk workers. Thus, high—risk work-
ers in their attempt to obtain higher sick pay rates, apparently need to
accept lower wages as predicted by screening contracts. However, sick pay-
ment, the amount paid out when sick, is the product of wage and sick pay
rate. The third column in Table 5 shows that high—risk workers actually
get a bad deal as their average sick payments are no diﬀerent from those of
low—risk workers.
The forth column of Table 5 shows that high—risk workers do not seem
to feel obliged to reciprocate higher sick—pay rates through higher eﬀort
(eﬀorts of high—risk and low—risk workers are not significantly diﬀerent).
And in fact, the previous paragraph shows that they should not feel obliged
as they receive the same sick payment as low—risk workers. On average,
low—risk workers obtain a significantly higher payoﬀ than high—risk workers
(p = 0.023). However, this diﬀerence essentially vanished when a minimum
level of sick pay is mandated. Low—risk workers are particularly harmed by
the introduction of a mandated minimum sick pay rate.
Table 5: Average wages, sick pay, eﬀorts, and profits of high- and low—risk
workers
Wage Sick Sick Eﬀort Worker’s
pay payment payoﬀ
HetFree low—risk 73.47 37.12% 27.32 4.08 61.10
HetFree high—risk 67.50 40.90% 26.59 3.86 50.45
HetMan low—risk 69.08 54.63% 39.93 3.80 54.83
HetMan high—risk 65.14 57.73% 40.26 3.21 52.80
Averages calculated for accepted contracts.
Already in Table 3 was saw that the lemon problem in the market for
sick pay is not very severe. In fact, employers oﬀer about the same sick pay
rates in Man treatments as in Free treatments. Although they make lower
profits with high—risk workers, they manage to oﬀer the same average rate
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of sick pay. Profits of employers are even slightly higher in Het treatments
as compared to Hom treatments although the diﬀerence is not significant
(see Table 3).
Result 3 (Adverse Selection): We find evidence of adverse selection:
workers with higher probability of being sick choose contracts with
higher sick pay and vice versa. However, we can reject the hypothesis
that adverse selection leads to employers oﬀering less sick pay.
4.4 Competition in the labor market and sick pay
The provision of sick pay in labor markets is likely to depend in an important
way on the type of competition in this market. This is already shown in
Duersch et al. (2009) where markets in which employers compete for workers
are compared to markets in which they do not. In markets with one—to—
one matching of firms and workers, firms oﬀer sick pay only very rarely.
Competition on the other hand evidently forces them to oﬀer sick pay. Thus,
our paper mainly applies to labor market for very qualified labor in which
there is strong competition for employees. Our finding that sick pay is
provided voluntarily agrees with empirical stylized fact (see Economic Policy
Institute, 2007) that highly qualified workers are much more likely to obtain
sick pay than low qualified ones.12
The strong competition on the employer side in our setting stems from
the fact that employers can employ more than one worker while workers can
only work for one employer. In fact, workers end up with a contract in more
than 99% of cases in HomFree and HomMan and in more than 97% of cases
in HetFree and HetMan. On the other hand, employers can in many cases
attract no worker (between 33% (HetFree) and 41% (HetMan) of cases),
while in about 26% of cases, employers attract 2 or more workers.
To assess the question whether competition is strong enough to force
employers to oﬀer sick pay, we run a fixed eﬀect linear probability regression
to obtain the probability that a proposed contract is being accepted by
workers. The explanatory variables are the wage and the sick pay rate.
Table 6 shows results of separate regressions for HomFree and HomMan and
for the diﬀerent worker types in the Het treatments. In all cases, higher
wages significantly increase the probability of a contract being accepted by
12For example, the chances of having access to sick pay are five—times lower for the
workers in the low wage category (earning less than $7.38 per hour) than for the workers in
the high wage category (earning more than 29.47 per hour) (see Economic Poliy Institute,
2007).
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a worker. This also holds with respect to sick pay in treatment HomFree
and for high—risk workers in the Het treatments. The eﬀect is much weaker
or insignificant in HomMan and for low—risk workers in the Het treatments.
It seems that low—risk workers are much less impressed by high sick pay
rates.
Table 6: Linear probability fixed—eﬀect regression: acceptance probabilities
of workers
Wage Sick pay
coeﬀ. std. err. P coeﬀ. std. err. P
HomFree .0058 .0004 .000 .0010 .0004 .008
HomMan .0098 .0007 .000 .0000 .0007 .996
HetFree low—risk .0053 .0005 .000 .0003 .0004 .419
HetFree high—risk .0031 .0005 .000 .0011 .0004 .009
HetMan low—risk .0039 .0004 .000 .0010 .0005 .033
HetMan high—risk .0036 .0003 .000 .0025 .0005 .000
Figure 6 shows how average wage and sick pay oﬀers develop over the
60 seconds of a period. It appears that employers post better oﬀers are at
the beginning of a period. This eﬀect is more pronounced for wages than
for sick pay. Clearly there is no bidding war at the end of the period by
employers who have not attracted any workers so far.
5 Conclusion
[references from old paper]
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